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Sep. 13th, 2007 11:04 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
lizzybennetI finished it.
Oh come on, I know you're dying to know all about Stalin's Foreign Policy...
Stalin’s Foreign Policy
All Good Things Come to Those Who Wait
Joseph Stalin has been referred to as “one of history’s most brutal, ruthless and suspicious rulers” (McMahon, 13) as well as neurotic, an unscrupulous schemer and “a revolutionary leader obsessed with self aggrandizement” (Z&P 11-12). The aforementioned descriptions do not paint the picture of a man who followed a cautious line of foreign policy. One might assume because of his ruthlessness and obsession with power that he would be reckless in his quest to expand this power. However, upon considering Stalin’s actions when dealing with other nations it is clear that he was a careful and thorough statesman. He was guarded in his relationships with the United States and Great Britain, and he proceeded carefully through the post-war negotiations. Stalin knew precisely what concessions he wanted for the USSR and he was able to maneuver for most of them, despite the fact that his requests were risky. Although Stalin was at times mistaken in his assumptions concerning the motives or actions of the United States, he almost always pursued a foreign policy of caution well balanced with risk-taking.
A common misconception in regards to Stalin, and one that I myself was guilty of, is that his efforts in foreign policy, such as expanded the Soviet Union’s land holdings, were simply because he was interested in expanding the revolutionary fervor of communism. Upon closer study, it becomes clear that Stalin was much more interested in creating a safe and secure zone to protect the Soviet Union from the threat of future invasions. Zubok and Pleshakov state “Stalin was the first stateman to grasp the notion that promoting world revolution was not a goal in and of itself, but rather that it provided the rationale for building a strong Soviet Union.” (Z&P, 13). Stalin believed firmly in the need for territorial security. His tendency to seek land for securities’ sake and not necessarily for expansion’s sake shows that he was a more cautious in his foreign policy than he is sometimes credited for.
Stalin’s attitude towards Hitler in the 1930’s is an excellent example of his cautious yet slightly risky attitude towards foreign policy. He was nervous that once again Germany would invade the Soviet Union just as in World War I. Stalin pushed Hitler to defy the system of Versailles hoping it would prevent Germany, Britain and France from conspiring together against the USSR. Stalin also felt that if he were allied with Germany, then his county would not be at risk of invasion. Hitler even agreed to “give” Stalin the buffer zone in Eastern Europe that he coveted. Stalin’s caution in taking steps to protect his country against a second German invasion was mixed with a great deal of risk taking. Unfortunately, in this case, his risk taking backfired and Hilter soon betrayed him and invaded Russia via the buffer zone he had just given to the USSR.
Although it went against his ideology, Stalin allied the USSR with Great Britain and the United States to fight against the Nazis in World War II. Again, we see that his need to protect and preserve the Soviet Union outweighs his political ideology and need for communist revolution. He was willing to “sleep with the enemy”, to put it crassly, in order to save his precious country. He soon discovered that he felt on equal footing with Churchill and Roosevelt (Z&P, 25), which must have bolstered his confidence when it came to the bargaining table.
At the Yalta Conference Stalin was careful in his requests. He avoided the topic of German reparations because he knew this was a subject that the USSR and the United States disagreed over. He felt it was to his “benefit to stay allied with America” (Z&P 32). However, he was also aware that the United States felt the same way and wanted to keep the benefit of the Soviet Union’s alliance as well. Therefore, while he was cautious on the subject of German reparations, he didn’t hesitant to ask for what he felt he was entitled to: the land in Eastern Europe as well as promises of land leases in China. Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to his terms. Stalin’s risk taking paid off. The Soviet Union once again would have its “buffer zone” against outside invasion.
Stalin’s tendencies towards cautious risk taking were not limited to dealings with the Allies. He also exhibited this inclination when forging agreements with China. Despite the fact that Mao was a proponent of communism, Stalin initially chose to fund Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist party. He felt the Chiang Kai-shek had a better chance of winning the civil war in China and he wanted the Soviet Union to have a “sphere of influence in Xinjiang, Outer Mongolia, Manchuria, and Korea” (Z&P, 17). Later, when it became clear that Mao’s troops would prevail, he switched his financial backing the Chinese communist party. For Stalin, it wasn’t necessarily always about ideology. He wanted to do what was best for his country. He wanted security.
Stalin believed strongly in the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. His actions often times seemed to contradict this belief, or place it on the bottom of his list of priorities. However, it is important to realize that part of his belief in Marxism-Leninism was that eventually, it would prevail. There was no need for Stalin to personally lead a world proletariat revolution because it was naturally going to happen (McMahon, 14). Stalin’s foreign policy revolved around the idea that if he kept the USSR safe and secure, the rest of the imperialist world would slowly collapse or destroy each other, leaving the powerful Soviet Union to come in and lead the workers’ to their glorious revolution.
And now I'm just going to relax. I love the fact that after this semester I only have two more classes to go and I'll be done with my BA in history. Yay!
Oh come on, I know you're dying to know all about Stalin's Foreign Policy...
Stalin’s Foreign Policy
All Good Things Come to Those Who Wait
Joseph Stalin has been referred to as “one of history’s most brutal, ruthless and suspicious rulers” (McMahon, 13) as well as neurotic, an unscrupulous schemer and “a revolutionary leader obsessed with self aggrandizement” (Z&P 11-12). The aforementioned descriptions do not paint the picture of a man who followed a cautious line of foreign policy. One might assume because of his ruthlessness and obsession with power that he would be reckless in his quest to expand this power. However, upon considering Stalin’s actions when dealing with other nations it is clear that he was a careful and thorough statesman. He was guarded in his relationships with the United States and Great Britain, and he proceeded carefully through the post-war negotiations. Stalin knew precisely what concessions he wanted for the USSR and he was able to maneuver for most of them, despite the fact that his requests were risky. Although Stalin was at times mistaken in his assumptions concerning the motives or actions of the United States, he almost always pursued a foreign policy of caution well balanced with risk-taking.
A common misconception in regards to Stalin, and one that I myself was guilty of, is that his efforts in foreign policy, such as expanded the Soviet Union’s land holdings, were simply because he was interested in expanding the revolutionary fervor of communism. Upon closer study, it becomes clear that Stalin was much more interested in creating a safe and secure zone to protect the Soviet Union from the threat of future invasions. Zubok and Pleshakov state “Stalin was the first stateman to grasp the notion that promoting world revolution was not a goal in and of itself, but rather that it provided the rationale for building a strong Soviet Union.” (Z&P, 13). Stalin believed firmly in the need for territorial security. His tendency to seek land for securities’ sake and not necessarily for expansion’s sake shows that he was a more cautious in his foreign policy than he is sometimes credited for.
Stalin’s attitude towards Hitler in the 1930’s is an excellent example of his cautious yet slightly risky attitude towards foreign policy. He was nervous that once again Germany would invade the Soviet Union just as in World War I. Stalin pushed Hitler to defy the system of Versailles hoping it would prevent Germany, Britain and France from conspiring together against the USSR. Stalin also felt that if he were allied with Germany, then his county would not be at risk of invasion. Hitler even agreed to “give” Stalin the buffer zone in Eastern Europe that he coveted. Stalin’s caution in taking steps to protect his country against a second German invasion was mixed with a great deal of risk taking. Unfortunately, in this case, his risk taking backfired and Hilter soon betrayed him and invaded Russia via the buffer zone he had just given to the USSR.
Although it went against his ideology, Stalin allied the USSR with Great Britain and the United States to fight against the Nazis in World War II. Again, we see that his need to protect and preserve the Soviet Union outweighs his political ideology and need for communist revolution. He was willing to “sleep with the enemy”, to put it crassly, in order to save his precious country. He soon discovered that he felt on equal footing with Churchill and Roosevelt (Z&P, 25), which must have bolstered his confidence when it came to the bargaining table.
At the Yalta Conference Stalin was careful in his requests. He avoided the topic of German reparations because he knew this was a subject that the USSR and the United States disagreed over. He felt it was to his “benefit to stay allied with America” (Z&P 32). However, he was also aware that the United States felt the same way and wanted to keep the benefit of the Soviet Union’s alliance as well. Therefore, while he was cautious on the subject of German reparations, he didn’t hesitant to ask for what he felt he was entitled to: the land in Eastern Europe as well as promises of land leases in China. Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to his terms. Stalin’s risk taking paid off. The Soviet Union once again would have its “buffer zone” against outside invasion.
Stalin’s tendencies towards cautious risk taking were not limited to dealings with the Allies. He also exhibited this inclination when forging agreements with China. Despite the fact that Mao was a proponent of communism, Stalin initially chose to fund Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist party. He felt the Chiang Kai-shek had a better chance of winning the civil war in China and he wanted the Soviet Union to have a “sphere of influence in Xinjiang, Outer Mongolia, Manchuria, and Korea” (Z&P, 17). Later, when it became clear that Mao’s troops would prevail, he switched his financial backing the Chinese communist party. For Stalin, it wasn’t necessarily always about ideology. He wanted to do what was best for his country. He wanted security.
Stalin believed strongly in the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. His actions often times seemed to contradict this belief, or place it on the bottom of his list of priorities. However, it is important to realize that part of his belief in Marxism-Leninism was that eventually, it would prevail. There was no need for Stalin to personally lead a world proletariat revolution because it was naturally going to happen (McMahon, 14). Stalin’s foreign policy revolved around the idea that if he kept the USSR safe and secure, the rest of the imperialist world would slowly collapse or destroy each other, leaving the powerful Soviet Union to come in and lead the workers’ to their glorious revolution.
And now I'm just going to relax. I love the fact that after this semester I only have two more classes to go and I'll be done with my BA in history. Yay!
no subject
Date: 2007-09-15 12:49 am (UTC)Two more classes...that is awesome! Then what? What is your next big adventure, Ted?